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Politics and the Constitution
To the Editors:
Judge Wright's examination of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Buckley
v. Valeo1 provides us with a valuable diagnosis of .the weakness of that
opinion.2 He accurately characterizes the opinion as a mechanical ap-
plication of pluralist doctrines, but he weakens the cogency of his critique
by advocating pluralism in another form. Judge Wright warns us about a
free market of social forces, yet he cites with approval Justice Holmes's
characterization of the First Amendment as a guarantee of the free market
of ideas. 3 In so doing, the Judge escapes one pluralist ideology only to
embrace another.
Holmes's most famous words about speech are:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very founda-
tions of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power
of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,
and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can
be carried out.4
These words can be construed in two ways: the success of an idea in free
competition is the best evidence of its truth; or, there is no such thing as
the truth of an idea, so the only meaningful warrant of an idea is that it
has succeeded in competition. I leave it to others to dispute which in-
terpretation of Holmes is correct. My point is that on either gloss, it
appears that the primary purpose of the First Amendment is to promote
the uninhibited transactions in ideas that make valuation of ideas pos-
sible.5
There is an alternative way of seeing the matter, a way that can be
traced back to James Madison. Justice Brennan emphasized it in the land-
mark opinion of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan:6 the central principle of
the First Amendment is that the citizenry is the master and the govern-
ment is the servant.7 In England, citizens were the King's loyal servants,
1. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
2. Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976).
3. Id. at 1018 n.68.
4. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting opinion).
5. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 308 (1972).
6. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
7. Id. at 274-75.
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and the prohibition against unseemly comments by the populace, that
which we call sedition, was a logical entailment of the master-servant rela-
tion. Our system of government is supposed to be different: officeholders
are the servants and citizens are the masters; citizens have free speech so
that they can censure their servants.
Justice Brennan did us a great service in reviving Madison's version of
the guarantee of freedom of speech. Harry Kalven did what he could to
emphasize the importance of what Brennan had revived.8 Without claim-
ing any originality, I would like to set forth the argument that Madison
had a theory of the First Amendment that differs from Holmes's theory, a
difference relevant to the campaign financing question.
When the guarantee of freedom of speech was first discussed in the
House of Representatives on August 15, 1789, Madison was not the first
speaker. Representative Sedgwick of Massachusetts wanted to eliminate the
language about assembly on the grounds that it was unnecessary, and
Representative Tucker of South Carolina wanted to add a provision for
instructing representatives.0 As soon as Madison got the floor, he explained
the guarantee with these words:
The right of freedom of speech is secured; the liberty of the press is
expressly declared to be beyond the reach of this Government; the
people may therefore publicly address their representatives[,] may
privately advise them, or declare their sentiments by petition to the
whole body; in all these ways they may communicate their will.10
A few years later, on November 27, 1794, the House was debating whether
it would be proper to pass a resolution censuring someone for words of
criticism. Madison stated: "If we advert to the nature of Republican
Government, we shall find that the censorial power is in the people over
the Government, and not in the Government over the people."'1
Given these comments, the words of Madison in his report on the
Virginia Resolutions against the Sedition Act of 179812 must be judged as
expressing his consistent position on this matte'i, and not as special plead-
ing for the occasion. In that report, Madison based his theory of the First
Amendment on the nature of republican government, stating at greater
length what he had already said in 1789 and 1794. In particular, he
rejected the restrictive common law definitions of freedom of speech by
stressing the difference between the government of the United States and
that of Great Britain. To quote merely one passage:
In [Great Britain], it is a maxim, that the king-an hereditary, not a
responsible magistrate-can do no wrong; and that the legislature,
8. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191, 204-10.
9. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 760-61 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789).
10. Id. at 766.
11. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794).
12. Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in IV J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE
FEDERAL CONSTITuTION 546 (Washington, D.C. 1836).
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which, in two thirds of its composition, is also hereditary, not re-
sponsible, can do what it pleases. In the United States, the executive
magistrates are not held to be infallible, nor the legislators to be
omnipotent; and both, being elective, are both responsible. Is it not
natural and necessary, under such different circumstances, that a
different degree of freedom in the use of the press should be con-
templated?' 3
I hope that the distinction between Madison and Holmes is clear
enough; I would now like to argue that Madison is right. The best way to
begin is to advert to Madison's famous Federalist No. 10,14 which, as Judge
Wright correctly notes,'5 is misused by the advocates of pluralist theories.
In that great essay, Madison did not argue that a free marketplace of ideas
was a guarantee of democracy. Indeed, he argued it might foster political
combinations in restraint of trade-he called them factions-and he saw
the great problem in constitution-making as the construction of practical
ways of checking the tendency of factions to take unfair advantage of their
strength.
I may be unduly influenced by the history of our century, but Madison's
pessimism seems realistic. The problem is recapturing his optimism that
we can check the evil consequences of our human nature without being
able to change it. Interestingly enough, Madison's prediction in No. 10
that the structure of the federal government would prevent the formation
of national factions has been verified. Our national parties are temporary
holding companies put together to win an election; they do not have the
discipline characteristic of European-style parties. One may deplore this
state of affairs, but one must admire Madison for his prescience.
We need to preserve that spirit of public censure of which Madison
spoke, but I fear that we will not be able to unless we are as realistic about
politics as Madison was. I share with Judge Wright his fear that the
ideology enshrined in the Buckley opinion is dangerous, in that it can
lead us to forget what we are about. We ought not worry about whether
our servants have enough money to propagandize us; we ought to worry
about how to ensure that our servants remain our servants.
How can we use Madison's censure theory to analyze limitations on cam-
paign expenditures? The premise that the citizen is the master and the
politician is the servant implies that it was wrong for the Buckley Court
to speak simpliciter of the First Amendment rights of politicians. 16 Poli-
ticians do not have a First Amendment right to be elected to office;
citizens do have a First Amendment right to have representatives of their
choosing hold office. Thus it makes no sense to talk of a restriction on
politicians as a restriction on First Amendment rights unless the restriction
on the politician hinders a citizen's ability to censure those officials who
displease her. Given this more precise statement of the abstract premises,
13. Id. at 570.
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
15. Wright, supra note 2, at 1020 n.72.
16. See 424 U.S. at 21-22, 32-35.
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the question narrows to the following: does a limit on campaign spending
by politicians hinder the citizen's ability to choose? The question is one of
legislative fact as to which the judiciary must make an independent as-
sessment, tempered by respect for legislative findings. A letter is no place
to argue this question of fact; let me simply say that I judge limitations on
politicians' spending to be constitutional and that I would draw upon the
same writings that Judge 'Wright cites in arguing the case.' 7
So far, I have offered merely a different theory with which to arrive at
Judge Wright's results, but the difference is not merely academic since
Madison's theory leads me to disagree with Judge Wright on the con-
stitutionality of the independent expenditure limitation. I have no trouble
saying that we can limit the amount of money that a candidate can spend.
I do have trouble, however, saying that we can limit the amount of money
that citizens can spend. The ceiling on independent expenditures is a
restriction that was intended to, and that in fact would, limit the quantity
of speech and, by definition, it is citizen speech that would be limited.
This limitation seems to me to impinge on the citizenry's capacity to
censure officeholders and, therefore, to violate the First Amendment as
Madison so compellingly construed it.
Lewis H. Larue
Professor of Law
Washington & Lee University
17. See Wright, supra note 2, at 1017 n.59.
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On March 19, 1957 the United States Senate confirmed the appoint-
ment of William J. Brennan, Jr. to the Supreme Court of the United
States. In the subsequent twenty years, the Court entered an ambitious
era of judicial activism, perhaps best characterized by the effort to
translate the lofty principles of the Bill of Rights into a practical code
of fair procedures. Often during this era Justice Brennan spoke for
the Court with a characteristic eloquence that challenged us to re-
member in the confusion of those times the idealism and compassion
on which this Nation was founded.
As the participants in this symposium demonstrate) we have en-
tered a new era in the history of the Supreme Court and a new juris-
prudence is ascendant. Justice Brennan often finds himself in disagree-
ment with the directions of the Burger Court, including those high-
lighted in this symposium. Yet Justice Brennan remains for the Court
and the legal profession generally a source of conscience. He constantly
reminds us that in the quest for judicial economy we not forget to
afford justice, and that in our manipulation of legal doctrine we re-
main sensitive to the needs of the people who stand behind the case
names. With deep admiration for his twenty years of service on the
Court, the Editors of the Yale Law Journal are proud to dedicate this
Issue to Justice Brennan.
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